CLI Finder / tools / gitleaks

Gitleaks for secret scanning in repositories

Scan repositories and working trees for leaked secrets before agents commit or open PRs.

Agent Readiness: 86/100 Verified publisher Actively maintained
86 /100

Gitleaks is useful for security-oriented agent workflows when scans stay report-first and remediation requires approval.

Structured output 88/100

Supports machine-readable scan output suitable for agent summaries and CI reports.

Non-interactive use 90/100

Can run in shell, CI, or agent sessions without prompts for common scanning tasks.

Safety boundaries 84/100

Scanning is generally safe, but remediation, ignore rules, and policy changes require review.

Agent docs 78/100

Help output and documented examples are sufficient for building AGENTS.md command rules.

Install options

Homebrew $ brew install gitleaks
Docker $ docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/path" zricethezav/gitleaks:latest detect --source /path

Common commands

Scan working tree · safe $ gitleaks detect --source . --report-format json --report-path gitleaks.json

Produces a JSON report that an agent can summarize.

Scan staged changes · safe $ gitleaks protect --staged --verbose

Checks staged files before commit.

Edit allowlist · requires review $ ${EDITOR:-vi} .gitleaks.toml

Changing ignore rules can hide real leaks and requires review.

Agent usage examples

Claude Code / Codex CLI Use Gitleaks to scan and summarize findings. Prefer JSON/SARIF output. Do not edit ignore rules, update dependencies, or delete files without approval.

Safety notes

  • Run scans in read-only/report mode before allowing an agent to modify files or suppress findings.
  • Treat ignore-file edits, policy changes, dependency updates, and destructive cleanup as approval-required.
  • Prefer JSON or SARIF output so the agent can cite exact findings instead of paraphrasing terminal text.

Agent workflow

Use Gitleaks before an agent commits or opens a PR. Generate a JSON or SARIF report, summarize exact file paths and rule IDs, and stop before editing allowlists.

Approval boundary

Allowlist edits, history rewrites, secret rotation, and deletion of evidence must require user review.